Reactions to Charles Taylor’s Conviction

Special Court for Sierra Leone Logo

As reported in a prior post, on April 26th the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted Charles Taylor, the former President of neighboring Liberia of 11 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes. The hearing on his sentencing has been scheduled for May 16th with the sentence to be pronounced on May 30th. The deadline for any appeal is 14 days after the sentencing judgment.

Before we look at the reactions to that conviction, we should be aware of the gruesome details of what happened in Sierra Leone according to witnesses at Taylor’s trial. Here are only two examples. One male witness, “Then I put this other hand. Then he [a Sierra Leone rebel] chopped it, but when he chopped it it was not severed initially. He chopped it twice, and it hit here and some bones were broken in it. Then the third time it was severed.” Another male witness, “Well, they [the rebels] used to treat them [civilians] badly. They used to rape them. They used to kill them. Sometimes they even ate them.” A video with photos of some of the Sierra Leone victims should be watched as well as current photos from the country.

Another aspect of the trial needs highlighting. One of the challenges facing the prosecution was how to link Mr. Taylor in Liberia to the crimes committed in Sierra Leone. There was no paper trail showing orders from Taylor. Nor was there any evidence of his ever going to Sierra Leone. He was not at the scene of the crimes in that country, and the Liberian army was not involved. Instead the link was proven by radio and telephone communications from Taylor to the rebels in Sierra Leone, by shipments of arms and ammunition to the rebels from Taylor’s forces and by bank records showing transfers of funds to Taylor’s accounts from Sierra Leone.

The Special Court’s chief prosecutor, Brenda J. Hollis, who is a U.S. lawyer, said the conviction was a triumph for the idea that political leaders should be held accountable  for their deeds in “the new reality of an international justice system.”

The U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights stated that the conviction “marked a major milestone in the development of international justice. . . .  A former President, who once wielded immense influence in a neighbouring [sic] country where tens of thousands of people were killed, mutilated, raped, robbed and repeatedly displaced for years on end, has been arrested, tried in a fair and thorough international procedure, and has now been convicted of very serious crimes.” Such a result, she said, was ”a stark warning to other Heads of State who are committing similar crimes, or contemplating doing so.”

The U.S. Department of State issued an official statement welcoming the conviction as “an important step toward delivering justice and accountability for victims, restoring peace and stability in the country and the region, and completing the Special Court for Sierra Leone’s mandate to prosecute those persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the atrocities committed in Sierra Leone. The Taylor prosecution at the Special Court delivers a strong message to all perpetrators of atrocities, including those in the highest positions of power, that they will be held accountable.” The U.S. statement also noted that the U.S. “has been a strong supporter and the leading donor of the Special Court  . . . since its inception. The successful completion of the Special Court’s work remains a top U.S. Government priority.”

Amnesty International (AI) asserted that the conviction sends “a clear message to leaders the world over that no-one is immune from justice.”  However, AI lamented that because of the limited jurisdiction and funding of the Special Court, “Thousands of persons suspected of criminal responsibility for incidences of unlawful killings, rape and sexual violence, mutilations and the use of children in Sierra Leone’s armed conflict have never been investigated, much less prosecuted.” In addition, AI emphasized that “only a limited number of Sierra Leone’s thousands of victims who bear the terrible scars of the conflict have received reparations, despite the [provisions for reparations in the Sierra Leone] Peace Accord and the clear recommendations [for reparations] by [Sierra Leone's] Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” AI also reiterated its call for the repeal of the amnesty provision in the Peace Accord and [for Sierra Leone's] enactment of legislation defining crimes against humanity and war crimes as crimes under Sierra Leone law.”

Human Rights Watch had a similar reaction. It said the conviction “sends a message to those in power that they can be held to account for grave crimes.”

A New York Times editorial said the conviction “is a historic victory for justice and accountability: the first time a former head of state has been convicted by an international court since the Nuremberg trials after World War II. Mr. Taylor . . . richly deserves this distinction.” The editorial also reminded us that “other leaders . . .  deserve the same fate” from the International Criminal Court in its prosecutions of the Ivory Coast’s brutal former president, Laurent Gbagbo, and Sudan’s current president, Omar Hassan al-Bashir.

The Guardian newspaper from London commented that the conviction was “an important step in what can only be described as the faltering path of international justice.” It noted that even though there were dysfunctional justice systems in Russia and China, it is “a safe bet that no Russian [or Chinese] leader will ever appear before an international court of justice for war crimes . . . . The same is true of . . . US or British generals for war crimes committed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Might, or a seat on the UN security council, still appears to be right. If the arm of international law is long, it is also selective. . . .  If impunity is to end, jurisdiction has to be universal.”

Taylor’s conviction was for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Sierra Leone. But the conviction reminded Liberians of the horrible similar crimes committed in their country by Taylor and his forces.

Charles Taylor (Rebel leader)

Charles Taylor, President of Liberia

An expert on Liberia stated that in “Liberia, Mr. Taylor fought a brutal campaign against West African peacekeepers and other armed factions. As many as 250,000 Liberians out of a prewar population of just over [3,000,000] lost their lives, while more than [1,000,000] others became refugees — crimes for which no one has yet been held accountable. An internationally brokered peace deal in 1997 led to the travesty of a frightened population’s electing Mr. Taylor president for fear of what would happen if he did not get his way. He was driven from power only in 2003.” Moreover, “many of his closest former associates remain at large and active in public life . . . . Mr. Taylor’s ex-wife, Jewel Howard Taylor, who filed for divorce after his fall from power in part to protect her assets from international sanctions, is a member of the Liberian Senate. So is Prince Y. Johnson, a onetime Taylor ally who literally butchered President Samuel K. Doe at the start of the civil war and was so certain of his impunity that he had the entire episode videotaped for posterity. Far from becoming a pariah, Mr. Johnson played kingmaker in Liberia’s presidential election last year, delivering the bloc of votes that assured President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf a second term.”

The previously mentioned New York Times editorial said that Taylor now “must also be held accountable for his role in Liberia’s 14-year civil war. Liberia needs to enact the legislation to bring him, and the other murderous warlords from that era, to trial either in Liberian or international courts.”

Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch also remembered that Taylor and his forces had committed grave crimes in his native Liberia, but had not been subject to any criminal prosecutions for those crimes. Said AI, “during “the 14-year Liberian civil war that raged while Taylor was first the leader of one of the numerous armed opposition groups and later the President, all parties to the conflict committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murders along ethnic lines, as well as torture, rapes and other crimes of sexual violence, abductions, and recruitment and use child soldiers.” After the end of the civil war, AI said the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation commission had recommended “that a criminal tribunal be established to prosecute people identified as responsible for crimes under international law [but that it] is yet to be implemented, as are most TRC recommendations on legal and other institutional reforms, accountability, and reparations.  The lack of justice for the victims of the Liberian conflict is shocking. The government of Liberia must end the reign of impunity by enacting the necessary legislation and acting on its duty to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators.”

Finally, two African observers commented that justice having “had to come from international courts does not reflect well on . . .  Liberia in particular. The process exposes the failure by Liberians to provide themselves with a legal and judiciary system capable of effectively administering justice.” More generally “the verdict and the process should be a wakeup call to Africans. The successful conviction for such crimes is a glaring example of the failure of Africans to govern themselves effectively. . . . Africans must focus on building strong institutions to deal with human rights violations ourselves . . . .” On the other hand, the conviction “informs future Liberian, and indeed African, dictators and tyrants that they cannot escape justice by hedging their bets on a dysfunctional domestic legal system. Where national systems are incapable of adequately and effectively prosecuting leaders who engage in wanton violations of human rights, citizens can look to the international criminal court for justice.”

Former Liberian President Convicted of Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes

Special Court for Sierra Leone Logo

Charles Taylor

On April 26, 2012, the Special Court for Sierra Leone convicted Charles Taylor, the former President of neighboring Liberia, of 11 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes as defined in the Court’s governing Statute.

The Court’s judgment was based upon detailed findings that the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that:

• Sierra Leone rebels had committed crimes against humanity in Sierra Leone by murder (Count 2), rape (Count 4), sexual slavery (Count 5), other inhumane acts (Count 8) and enslavement (Count 10).

• Said rebels had committed violations of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and of their Additional Protocol II in Sierra Leone by acts of terrorism (Count 1), violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular murder (Count 3); outrages upon personal dignity (Count 6); violence to life, health and physical or mental well-being of persons, in particular cruel treatment (Count 7); and pillage (Count 11).

• Said rebels had committed violations of international humanitarian law in Sierra Leone by conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 years into armed forces or groups, or using them to participate actively in hostilities (Count 9).

• Mr. Taylor had provided practical assistance, encouragement and moral support that had a substantial effect on the commission of said crimes by the rebels, and he knew that such crimes were being committed and that his actions would provide said practical assistance, encouragement or moral support to the commission of such crimes. Therefore, Mr. Taylor was guilty of the crime of aiding and abetting the commission of such crimes.

The Court, however, determined that the prosecution had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Taylor had participated in a common plan, design or purpose to commit the rebels’ crimes.

Mr. Taylor will be sentenced in the coming weeks. There is no death penalty in international criminal law, and any prison term would be served in a British prison pursuant to a special agreement with the Court.

The Court was established in 2002 in a partnership between the United Nations and Sierra Leone to prosecute those responsible for atrocities in a conflict that led almost half the population to flee and left an estimated 50,000 dead. With its main seat in Sierra Leone’s capital of Freetown, the Court already has sentenced eight other leading members from different forces and rebel groups for crimes in Sierra Leone. Mr. Taylor is its last defendant whose trial was moved to The Hague in the Netherlands for fear of causing unrest in the region where he still has followers.

Not since Karl Doenitz, the German admiral who briefly succeeded Hitler upon his death, was tried and sentenced by the International Military Tribunal has a head of state been convicted by an international court.

 

U.S. Establishes Atrocities Prevention Board

President Obama

On April 23, 2012, President Obama formally established the U.S. Atrocities Prevention Board (APB), a standing, inter-agency body responsible for coordinating policy on preventing mass atrocities and responding to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The President announced that the APB will help the U.S. government identify and address atrocity threats, and it will oversee institutional changes that will make the U.S. more nimble and effective on these issues. The intelligence community will collect and analyze information that allows the U.S. to improve its anticipation, understanding, and counters to atrocity threats. U.S. diplomats will encourage more robust multilateral efforts to prevent and respond to atrocities. The U.S. military and civilian workforce will be better equipped to prevent and respond to atrocities.

The APB also will promote new kinds of targeted sanctions; denial of entry to the U.S. of perpetrators of serious violations of human rights or humanitarian law or other atrocities; “surging” of specialized expertise in civilian protection on a rapid response basis in crisis situations; and blocking the flow of money to abusive regimes. In addition, the APB will monitor agencies’ compilation of after-action “lessons-learned” reports to record key innovations, areas of success, and issues requiring future work in the area of atrocity prevention and response. The USAID will award grants for innovative technologies that strengthen the U.S. government’s capacity for early warning, prevention, and response with respect to mass atrocities.

This presidential statement further announced efforts to hold accountable perpetrators of mass atrocities and genocide by strengthening the U.S. ability to prosecute perpetrators of atrocities found in the U.S. and to use immigration laws and immigration-fraud penalties to hold accountable perpetrators of mass atrocities.

In addition, the U.S. will support national, hybrid, and international mechanisms (including, among other things, commissions of inquiry, fact-finding missions, and tribunals) that seek to hold accountable perpetrators of atrocities when doing so advances U.S. interests and values, consistent with the requirements of U.S. law. This will include witness protection measures and technical assistance in connection with foreign and international prosecutions. The Administration will seek additional statutory authority to make reward payments for information that leads to the arrest of foreign nationals indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide by international, hybrid, or mixed criminal tribunals.

As the ad hoc international criminal tribunals and hybrid courts are nearing the end of their lives and as the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) has jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, the APB has let it be known that it will be continuing the Obama Administration’s policy of positive engagement with the ICC by assisting the ICC in accordance with this presidential statement.

Samantha Power

The Chair of the APB is Samantha Power, the U.S. National Security Council Senior Director for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights and the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of A Problem from Hell, a study of the U.S. foreign-policy response to genocide. Other APB members are senior officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, and government entities such as the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Office of the Vice President. U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice Stephen Rapp will also work closely with the APB.

The APB met for the first time on April 23rs at the White House. This was followed by panel presentations by experts and government officials, as well as interactions with civil society. Earlier in the day at the U.S. Holocaust Museum, President Obama said that the work of the APB, the first of its kind, is “not an afterthought,” and that preventing atrocity crimes “is not a sideline in our foreign policy.”

The APB owes its genesis to an August 2011 Presidential Study Directive declaring that “[p]reventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral responsibility” of the U.S. Therefore, the Directive called for the establishment of the APB “to coordinate a whole of government approach to preventing mass atrocities and genocide.” The objectives of such a board were to “ensure: (1) that our national security apparatus recognizes and is responsive to early indicators of potential atrocities; (2) that departments and agencies develop and implement comprehensive atrocity prevention and response strategies in a manner that allows ‘red flags’ and dissent to be raised to decision makers; (3) that we increase the capacity and develop doctrine for our foreign service, armed services, development professionals, and other actors to engage in the full spectrum of smart prevention activities; and (4) that we are optimally positioned to work with our allies in order to ensure that the burdens of atrocity prevention and response are appropriately shared.”

 

 

 

 

 

International Criminal Court’s First Conviction

Thomas Lubanga Dyilo

On March 14, 2012, the International Criminal Court (ICC) convicted its first defendant: Thomas Lubanga Dylio. [1]

The ICC’s three-judge Trial Chamber unanimously concluded, after a lengthy trial, that he was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a co-perpetrator of the war crimes of conscripting and enlisting children under the age of 15 and using them to participate in an internal armed conflict in 2002-2003 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At the time Lubanga was the President of a rebel group, the Commander-in-Chief of its military wing and its political leader.

At a hearing to be held on April 18th the Trial Chamber will consider the length of his sentence and the principles to be used in establishing reparations for the victims of these crimes. The ICC’s Prosecutor has said that his office will seek a sentence close to the maximum of 30 years under Article 77(1)(a) of the Court’s Rome Statute. It is anticipated that Lubanga will appeal his conviction and sentence to the ICC’s Appeals Chamber.

The Trial Chamber’s judgment also harshly criticized the Prosecutor for negligence in delegating investigations to unreliable intermediaries who had encouraged certain witnesses to give false testimony that had compelled the Court to exclude any reliance on their testimony.

The U.N.’s High Commissioner for Human Rights said this verdict “represented the coming of age of the [ICC] . . . and . . . [sent] a strong signal against impunity for such grave breaches of international law that will reverberate well beyond the D.R.C.”

The U.S. had similar words of commendation. The White House said the decision demonstrated that “the international community is united in its determination to end the repugnant practice of using child soldiers.” The U.S. Department of State noted that the conviction highlighted the “paramount international concern” over “the brutal practice of conscripting and using children to take a direct part in hostilities” and puts “perpetrators and would-be perpetrators of [such conduct] on notice that they cannot expect their crimes to go unpunished.”

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[1] A previous post reviewed the trial of this case while another post discussed interesting issues of witness protection in the case.

Spain’s Criminal Case Over U.S. Killing of Spanish Journalist in Iraq

Spain’s National Court (Audiencia Nacional), as mentioned in a prior post, has three criminal cases on its docket involving allegations of illegal conduct by U.S. officials with respect to U.S. interrogation of foreigners and war crimes. The Spanish court is involved because it has exercised its right under the international law principle of universal jurisdiction for a national court to exercise jurisdiction over such cases even if the crimes did not occur on its territory. We now look at the third of these three cases.

In May 2003, the mother (Maria Isabel Permuy Lopez) and other family members filed a criminal complaint with the Central Criminal Court for Preliminary Criminal Proceedings No. 1 at the Audiencia Nacional in Madrid. The subject of the case is the April 8, 2003, killing of her son, Jose Couso Permuy, who was a cameraman for a Spanish television station, in Baghdad, Iraq by a shell fired by a U.S. tank. The defendants are three U.S. infantrymen involved in the shelling.

On October 19, 2005, Judge Santiago Pedraz opened a preliminary investigation in light of the failure of the U.S. to provide responses to the Spanish court’s requests for information. The Judge also issued three international arrest warrants for the three U.S. infantrymen on charges of murder and war crimes.

On March 10, 2006, the case was closed by the Criminal Division of the National Court, but nine months later (December 2006), the Spanish Supreme Court reversed the dismissal.

Judge Pedraz in January 2007 reactivated the three arrest warrants and requested a freeze on the defendants’ assets. He also asked the U.S. to provide contact information for the defendants for an INTERPOL Red Notice, but the U.S. Ambassador to Spain advised the Spanish Attorney General that the U.S. would not respond to the request.

The next round was the April 2007 indictment of the defendants by Judge Pedraz for aggravated murder and crimes against the international community by attacking journalists. However, in May 2008, this was reversed by the Criminal Division of the National Court on an appeal by the National Court Chief Prosecutor.

The case, however, was not yet over. In May 2009 on the basis of new evidence Judge Pedraz issued new indictments for murder, crimes against humanity and violations of the Geneva Conventions. There also was another indictment in November 2011.

In summary, this case is still pending.

Collaterally the Couso family has asked the Spanish government for an investigation of the integrity of the Spanish criminal investigation of this case following the WikiLeaks release of certain U.S. diplomatic cables. This request has faced procedural problems and has not reached a final conclusion.

Universal Jurisdiction for the Most Serious Crimes

Under customary international law, a nation state’s courts have jurisdiction over crimes where there is some link, usually territorial, between that state and the crime. In addition, under customary international law and certain treaties, a state has universal jurisdiction over certain crimes of international concern regardless of where the crime was committed or the nationality of the victim or perpetrator. These crimes of international concern are (a) piracy; (b) slavery; (c) war crimes; (d) crimes against peace; (e) crimes against humanity; (f) genocide; and (g) torture.[1]

Amnesty International recently released a comprehensive review of domestic statutes regarding criminal jurisdiction in the 193 members of the United Nations. It found that 75% of the members provided for universal  jurisdiction over one or more of the above crimes.  Yet there are many obstacles to effective use of these jurisdictional statutes. States often incorporate incomplete or incorrect definitions of such crimes into their domestic codes. Another obstacle is incorporation of defenses that are inconsistent with the international law for these crimes: following superior orders; statutes of limitation; amnesty laws; pardons; and immunities.[2]

On the other hand, this study found only 19 states have actually invoked universal jurisdiction since World War II. They are Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the U.S.[3]

As we have seen, one of these 19 states–Spain–currently is invoking its domestic statute that implements the principle of universal jurisdiction for its criminal prosecution of former Salvadoran military officers for the November 1989 murders of the six Jesuit priests and their cook and her daughter at the Universidad de Centro America in San Salvador.[4] Spain’s statute provides that its National Court (La Audiencia Nacional) has universal jurisdiction for war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and torture.[5]

In 2009 Spain adopted an amendment that added the following conditions or limitations on such jurisdiction: (1) the alleged perpetrators are in Spain; or (2) the victims are of Spanish nationality; or (3) there is another connecting link to Spain. In addition, the amendment specified that for such Spanish jurisdiction to exist another country or international tribunal had not started a process involving an investigation and successful prosecution of such offenses; if there is such another process, then the Spanish court should suspend or stay its case until the other investigation and prosecution has been concluded. The latter provision is referred to as the subsidiary principle.[6]

This amendment has been seen by some as a significant and regrettable limitation on universal jurisdiction in Spain.[7] In my opinion, however, the amendment is a reaffirmation of Spain’s implementation of such jurisdiction, and the limitations are reasonable to make efficient use of Spanish judicial resources. Moreover, the subsidiary principle is similar to the International Criminal Court’s notion of complementarity whereby the ICC does not take a criminal case if there is a good faith criminal investigation or prosecution in a national court system or a good faith decision by a state not to prosecute.[8] The same considerations find expression in the U.S. notions of comity or forum non conveniens whereby a civil case in an U.S. court is stayed or dismissed if it makes more sense for the case to be litigated in another country.

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[1] David Weissbrodt, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, Joan Fitzpatrick, and Frank Newman, International Human Rights: Law, Policy and Process, at 572-86 (4^th ed. 2009); Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction (2001). Especially noteworthy is a blog exclusively devoted to universal jurisdiction: http://ergaomnesnet.wordpress.net.

[2] Amnesty Int’l, Universal Jurisdiction: A Preliminary Survey of Legislation Around the World (Oct. 2001 ["AI Study"]; van Schaack, Amnesty International Universal Jurisdiction Study, IntLawGrlls (Nov. 30, 2011).

[3] Id.

[4] Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court’s Case Regarding the Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (Aug. 26, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: Spanish Court Issues Criminal Arrest Warrants for Salvadoran Murders of Jesuit Priests (May 31, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: Developments in Spanish Court’s Case Regarding the Salvadoran Murders of the Jesuit Priests (Aug. 26, 2001); Post: Spain Requests Extradition of Suspects in Jesuits Case (Dec. 3, 2011).

[5] AI Study at 105; Human Rights Watch, Universal Jurisdiction in Europe, ch. XII (June 27, 2006). The Criminal Division of the Spanish National Court in Madrid has six chambers. An instructing (or investigative) judge presides over each chamber. Once an instructing judge accepts a criminal case, that judge initiates an investigation. After the completion of the investigation, the instructing judge closes the case and transfers it within the court to a panel usually of three judges who will preside over the trial or “oral phase” of the case. Such criminal cases are commenced by ordinary citizens filing a criminal complaint. If a victim files the complaint directly with an instructing judge, then the victim becomes a party to the case for further proceedings. This is known as a private prosecution (acusacion particular). (Center for Justice & Accountability, The Spanish National Court: An Overview of La Audiencia Nacional, http://www.cja.org/article.php?id=342&printsafe=1.)

[6] Spain, Government Gazette No. 266, Law I/2009, First Article (Nov. 4, 2009) (amendment to Article 23.4 of Organic Law 6/1985) (Google English translation); Burnett & Simons, Push in Spain to Limit Reach of the Court, N.Y. Times (May 20, 2009); Burnett, Spain Votes on Changes to Inquiry Law, N.Y. Times, (June 26, 2009); Assoc. Press, Spain Shortens Long Arm of Justice, N.Y. Times (Oct. 15, 2009).

[7] Center for Justice & Accountability, Bill Restricting Spain’s Universal Jurisdiction Law Passes First Round of Voting, http://cja.org/article.php?id=666 (circa June 25, 2009); Human Rights Watch, The world needs Spain’s universal jurisdiction law (June 27, 2009).

[8]  Post: International Criminal Court: Introduction (April 28, 2011).

International Criminal Court: ICC’s First Trial To End This Week

International Criminal Court

This Thursday and Friday (August 25th and 26th), the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will hear closing arguments in its first trial. Thereafter in due course the Chamber will issue its decision. The trial started in January 2009, and the evidence phase concluded in May 2011 after 220 days of hearing of testimony from 62 witnesses, including four experts called by the Trial Chamber itself. The Trail Chamber issued 307 oral decisions and 624 written decisions.[1]

The accused in this trial is Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. He is the alleged founder and leader of UPC (Union des patriots congolais). He is charged with war crimes consisting of enlisting and conscripting children under the age of 15 years and using them in hostilities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).[2]

In another ICC development, Grenada on August 1st became the 115th State Party to the ICC’s Rome Statute.[3]

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[1] ICC Press Release, Trial of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: The presentation of evidence stage is closed (May 20, 2011); Reuters, ICC’s Landmark Debut Trial Concludes After Two Years, N.Y. Times (Aug. 24, 2011).

[2] See Post: International Criminal Court: Introduction (April 28, 2011); Post: International Criminal Court: Investigations and Prosecutions (April 28, 2011); Post: International Criminal Court: Protection of Witnesses (Aug. 19,2011).

[3]  ICC Press Release, ICC welcomes Grenada as a new State Party (Aug. 23, 2011).

International Criminal Court: Protection of Witnesses

The International Criminal Court’s Trial Chamber recently confronted two interesting issues regarding protection of witnesses in its proceedings:

What should the Court do with a witness’ request not to be returned to his home country because of alleged fear of persecution due to his testimony?

What should the Court do with that witness’ claim for asylum due to an alleged well founded fear of persecution in his home country due to his                                                          political opinions as expressed in his testimony?[1]

Thomas Lubanga Dyilo

These issues arose in the ICC prosecution of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), who is charged with two war crimes. One is his allegedly enlisting and conscripting of children under the age of 15 years into a Congolese rebel group (Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC)) and using them to participate actively in hostilities in the context of an international armed conflict. The other is doing the same thing in the context of an armed conflict not of an international character.[2]

The unnamed witness (Defense Witness 19) had been in detention in the DRC pending determination of criminal charges against him. Upon the application of defense counsel, the Court requested the DRC to transfer him to the Court to testify voluntarily at the trial. The DRC agreed to this request, pursuant to Article 93(7) of the Rome Statute that requires the individual to be returned to [the DRC] after testifying.

The witness was called to testify by defense counsel, who said the witness wished to testify in public without protective measures. At the start of his testimony, however, the witness expressed concerns about his safety and that of his family in the DRC, but he did not formally request protection from the Court at that time or during the course of his testimony.

The witness testified on a broad range of subjects, including his role in the rebel group, Lubanga’s position in the group, and the group’s conduct during the conflicts. The witness seriously challenged three named individuals in the DRC government.

After his testimony was finished and after the Court’s Registry had advised the Trial Chamber that the witness needed to be returned to the DRC as soon as possible, the witness filed a formal request for protection, i.e., a stay, and eventual cancellation, of his removal to the DRC and facilitation of his asylum application to the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Trial Chamber ordered the stay of his removal while his application for protection was considered.

Witness’ Request for Cancellation of Removal to DRC

Under Article 68(1) of the Rome Statute, the “Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.” To assist the Court in ruling on an application for such measures, it may request its Victims and Witness Unit (VWU), pursuant to Article 68(4), to provide advice.

That was done, and the VWU told the Trial Chamber that if returned to the DRC the witness “would not be exposed to any additional risk to his security or psychological or physical well-being as a result of his testimony;” that his testimony did not provide any new information to the DRC; that the DRC had provided assurances that the witness would receive adequate protection upon return; and the VWU would monitor his treatment after return.

The Chamber concluded that the VWU was the body within the ICC with the necessary qualified staff and expertise to evaluate the risks posed to a witness, that the Court had complied with its obligations under Article 68 of the Statute to consider the application for protection, that the request for cancellation of his removal to the DRC should be denied and that the witness should be returned to the DRC. However, the Court’s Registry was instructed to contact the DRC authorities to determine what, if any, additional security measures should be implemented upon return, and the VWU was instructed to monitor the witness’ well-being.

Witness’ Application for Asylum

The ICC is not a state and is not a party to the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.[3] Therefore, the Trial Chamber concluded it had no jurisdiction to address the merits of the witness’ asylum application.

Instead, it was exclusively for the Kingdom of the Netherlands to consider and make a determination on that application. However, the Trial Chamber instructed the ICC’s Registry to afford the witness reasonable access to his lawyers on the asylum application and to work out procedures for the witness’ asylum application to be determined by the Netherlands before his return to the DRC.

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[1] Redacted Decision on the request of [Defense Witness 19] for special protective measurs relating to his asylum application, Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo(ICC Trial Chamber Aug. 5, 2011), http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1189724.pdf; Ramji-Nogales, International criminal law meets non-refoulement (July 8, 2011), http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/2011/07/international-criminal-law-meets-non.html.

[2]  ICC, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations.

[3] See Post: Refugee and Asylum Law: Modern Era (July 9, 2011).

International Criminal Justice: U.S. Reportedly Failed To Detain Rwandan Indictee of Spanish Court

In May 2011 Justus Majyambere, a major in the Rwandan Defense Forces, apparently visited the U.S. Military Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas as an official representative of his government. The purpose of the visit was to obtain ideas for starting a military college in Rwanda.[1]

That sounds like a positive development.

But Majyambere is under indictment by a Spanish court for alleged involvement in the killing of nine employees of a Spanish NGO in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Therefore, he is under an Interpol “red notice,” a worldwide bulletin that is roughly equivalent to an arrest warrant. As a result, he reportedly was arrested upon his recent arrival in the U.S., but mysteriously was not detained and sent to Spain.[2]

If all of this is true, it is contrary to repeated statements by U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, Stephen Rapp, about U.S. supporting the arrest of fugitives from international criminal justice.[3] It is also contrary to the global goal of punishing and deterring violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

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[1] Rosen, U.S. Hosted Alleged Rwandan War Criminal for Military Visit, (June 20, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/06/us-hosted-alleged-rwandan-war-criminal-for-military-visit/240679/.

[2]  Id.

[3]  See Post: The International Criminal Court and the Obama Administration (May 13, 2011); Post: The International Criminal Court: Possible U.N. Security Council Referral of Syrian Human Rights Abuses to ICC (June 18, 2011).

International Criminal Justice: Mladic Update

On May31st Ratko Mladic arrived at The Hague and immediately was locked up in the Dutch prison used by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).[1]

In the five days since his arrest and ordered extradition on May 26th,[2] Mladic appealed the Serbian court’s order of extradition to The Hague. The appeal asserted that he is physically and mentally unfit for trial. On May 31st the appeal was rejected.[3]

The following is a summary of the ICTY charges facing Mladic:

• Genocide and complicity in genocide: for leading Bosnian Serb forces who massacred 8,000 Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica in 1995 and ethnically cleansed towns and villages in Bosnia of non-Serbs throughout the 1992-95 Bosnian war.
• Crimes against humanity by persecution on the basis of religion: for killing, torturing, raping, deporting and illegally imprisoning Muslims and Croats.
• War crimes by extermination, murder and cruel treatment: for widespread killing of non-Serb civilians in towns and villages targeted by Bosnian Serb forces and for the deadly campaign of sniping and shelling of civilians during the 44-month siege of the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo.
• War crimes by taking hostages: for taking hostage United Nations military observers and peacekeepers. [4]

Through his son Mladic has denied that he ordered the massacre at Srebrenica.[5]

Now attention is being paid to how Mladic was able for so long to avoid arrest and whether those who aided his evasion of legal process are liable for crimes.[6]

Mladic still has supporters in Serbia, and on May 29th around 10,000 of them rallied in Belgrade to protest the arrest and threatened extradition of Mladic to the ICTY at The Hague. The crowd also demanded the resignation of the Serbian president, Boris Tadic, whom they called a traitor to Serbia for his willingness to hand over alleged war criminals to the tribunal.[7]

The ICTY has jurisdiction over perpetrators of atrocities committed during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, including grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide and crimes against humanity. It has indicted 161 ethnic Serbs, Croats and Muslims, the majority of whom are Serbs. The following summarizes the status of these 161 cases:[8]

Concluded cases:	Convicted & sentenced	64
	Acquitted	13
	Referred to national court	13
	Withdrawn/deceased	36
	SUBTOTAL	126
Pending Cases:	Appeal after trial	16
	At trial	14
	Pre-trial	4
	At large	1
	SUBTOTAL	35
TOTAL		161

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[1] Simons, Mladic Arrives in the Hague, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/world/europe/01serbia.html?ref=world&pagewanted=print.

[2] See Post: International Criminal Justice: Mladic To Face Charges at ICTY (May 27, 2011).

[3] Carvajal, Mladic Appeals Extradition on Health Ground, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/world/europe/31serbia.html?ref=world; Carvajal, Mladic Extradition Appeal Rejected, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/world/europe/01serbia.html?hp.

[4] Associated Press, A Summary of War Crimes Charges Against Mladic, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/05/31/world/europe/AP-EU-Mladic-The-Charges-Glance.html?hp; ICTY, Case Information Sheet: Ratko Mladic,  http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/cis/en/cis_mladic_en.pdf.

[5] Beaumont & Meikle, Ratko Mladic denies ordering Srebrenica massacre, says his son, Guardian (May 30, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/may/29/ratko-mladic-denies-ordering-srebrenica-massacre.

[6] Carvajal & Erlanger, Serb Fugitve Slowly Starved of Friends and Cash, N.Y. Times (May 29, 2011),   http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/world/europe/30mladic.html?ref=world.

[7] Erlanger, Demonstrators Rally Against Mladic Extradition, N.Y. Times (May 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/30/world/europe/30serbia.html?ref=world.

[8] ICTY, Key Figures, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures;  Associated Press, An Overview of the Yugoslav War Crimes Court, N.Y. Times (May 31, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2011/05/31/world/europe/AP-EU-Mladic-Tribunal-Glance.html?ref=world. See also Post: International Criminal Justice: Introduction (April 26, 2011); Post: International Criminal Justice: The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (May 28, 2011).
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